• Change the incentives of traders and large profit centers at large financial institutions with “bonus-malus” reserve accounts, which penalize employees whose actions trade current profit for future losses. This would essentially bring "clawbacks" into the compensation system. UBS's bonus scheme, granting bonuses in the form of claims on a portfolio of toxic assets, is a good example.
• Prevent obvious regulatory arbitrage (privatizing, for example, the financial investments of government-sponsored enterprises) and charge for guarantees – deposit insurance, too big to fail, loan guarantees and the bailout – using marking-to-market that reflects leverage and risk in a continual manner. It will be good to know whether the financial system can even pay for the subsidies it receives.
• Recognize the negative externality of LCFIs. Then quantify the systemic risk of LCFIs and “tax” (through capital requirements or deposit insurance fees) their contributions to systemic risk rather than individual risk. This is hard to do, but present regulations do not even claim to address the problem. The need for such systemic risk regulation, possibly by augmenting Central Bank agendas, is only underscored by the growing size of the few remaining players in the financial arena.
• Enforce greater transparency of over-the-counter derivatives positions and off-balance-sheet transactions, employing centralized clearing for standardized products and, at a minimum, centralized registries for customized ones so that counterparty risk can be assessed.
• Prevent obvious regulatory arbitrage (privatizing, for example, the financial investments of government-sponsored enterprises) and charge for guarantees – deposit insurance, too big to fail, loan guarantees and the bailout – using marking-to-market that reflects leverage and risk in a continual manner. It will be good to know whether the financial system can even pay for the subsidies it receives.
• Recognize the negative externality of LCFIs. Then quantify the systemic risk of LCFIs and “tax” (through capital requirements or deposit insurance fees) their contributions to systemic risk rather than individual risk. This is hard to do, but present regulations do not even claim to address the problem. The need for such systemic risk regulation, possibly by augmenting Central Bank agendas, is only underscored by the growing size of the few remaining players in the financial arena.
• Enforce greater transparency of over-the-counter derivatives positions and off-balance-sheet transactions, employing centralized clearing for standardized products and, at a minimum, centralized registries for customized ones so that counterparty risk can be assessed.
私有部门的失败居然导致了系统风险，这是亚当斯密、凯恩斯都想不到的。
博文
没有评论:
发表评论